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Recent Developments 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: 
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
HELD APPliCABLE TO FEDERAL 
RACE-CONSCIOUS PROGRAMS 
In Metro Broadcasting, fnc. v. FCC, 
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990), the Supreme 
Court held that FCC race-conscious 
minority preference policies did not vio-
late equal protection principles. The 
Court applied a mid-level standard of 
review to determine that the FCC poli-
cies were substantially related to the 
achievement of the important govern-
mental objective of broadcast diversity. 
In the first of two consolidated cases 
the petitioner, Metro Broadcasting 
(Metro), challenged the Federal Com-
munication Commission's (FCC) policy 
awarding preference to minority broad-
cast station owners in comparative hear-
ings. Rainbow Broadcasting (Rainbow), 
a minority owned company, received a 
contract to construct and operate a new 
UHF television station, upon which 
Metro Broadcasting, a nonminority 
company, also bade. After a comparative 
hearing, the FCC gave Rainbow a higher 
rating than Metro based on Rainbow's 
ninety percent minority ownership. The 
Board determined that Rainbow's minority 
credit outweighed Metro's local resi-
dence and civic participation, and thus 
awarded the contract to Rainbow. Metro 
Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3005-06. 
In the companion case, respondent, 
Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford 
(Shurberg), challenged the FCC's "dis-
tress sale" policy contending it violated 
its equal protection rights under the 
fifth amendment. The distress sale pol-
icy permitted a radio or television broad-
caster, whose license has been desig-
nated for a revocation hearing, to assign 
or transfer the license to an FCC ap-
proyed minority enterprise. Astroline 
Communications (Astroline), a minor-
ity enterprise, purchased an existing 
broadcast license through a distress 
sale, thereby precluding Shurberg, a 
nonminority enterprise, from compet-
ing for the license. The FCC relied on 
congressional action and found Shur-
berg's equal protection claim meritless. 
fd. at 3007. Both Shurberg and Metro 
appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia. On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals invalidated 
the FCC distress sale policy as it deprived 
Shurberg of its constitutional right to 
equal protection under the fifth amend-
ment. fd. The court affirmed the FCC's 
decision in Metro as supported by con-
gressional action. Metro's petitions for a 
rehearing were denied. 
The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to review the issue of 
whether the FCC's minority preference 
policies violated equal protection prin-
ciples under the fifth amendment. In 
reviewing these consolidated cases, the 
Court emphasized the expressed action 
of Congress to implement these poli-
cies. The Court, relying on Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), noted 
that the appropriate deference must be 
given to Congress' power to provide for 
the general welfare of the United States 
and enforce by legislation the equal pro-
tection guarantees of the fourteenth 
amendment. Metro Broadcasting, 110 
S. Ct. at 3008. 
In deciding Metro Broadcasting, the 
Court had to choose between its analy-
sis in Fullilove v. Klutznick and City of 
Richmond v. fA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469 (1989). In Fullilove the Court ap-
plied a mid-level scrutiny analysis and 
found constitutional a congressionally 
imposed minority set-aside under which 
ten percent of all federal funds used for 
local public works projects were re-
quired to go to Minority Business Enter-
prises. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 
3009. However, in Croson, a recent 
minority set-aside case, the Court app-
lied a strict scrutiny analysis and rejected 
as unconstitutional a Minority Business 
Enterprise program enacted by a local 
government. fd. 
Adopting the position taken by three 
justices in Fullilove, the Court deter-
mined that an intermediate level of 
scrutiny should be applied to the FCC 
race-based classifications. In doing so, 
the Court held that benign racial mea-
sures mandated by Congress were con-
stitutionally permissible to the extent 
that they served an important govern-
mental objective and are substantially 
related to the achievement of those 
objectives. fd. The Court reasoned that 
such race-conscious measures mandated 
by Congress were permissible even if 
they were not '''remedial' in the sense of 
being designed to compensate victims 
of past governmental or societal dis-
crimination .... " fd. 
The Court went on to distinguish 
Metro Broadcasting from Croson. The 
Court noted the presence of congres-
sional action in Metro as opposed to 
state legislative action in Croson. fd. The 
Court then determined that Croson did 
not undermine Fullilove, but under-
scored it. ReasOning that the federal 
government had traditionally been more 
instrumental than state legislatures in 
combatting racial discrimination, the 
Court held the rationale in Fullilove 
recognized that the race-conscious clas-
sifications adopted by Congress were 
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subject to a different standard of review 
than classifications prescribed by state 
and local governments. [d. Thus, apply-
ing the mid-level standard of scrutiny 
proposed by Fullilove, the Court held 
the FCC minority ownership policies 
constitutional. [d. at 3008-09. 
In upholding the FCC's minority pol-
icy, the Court held that promoting mi-
nority ownership of broadcasting sta-
tions served an important governmental 
objective. [d. The Court agreed with the 
congressional and FCC findings that mi-
nority preference policies promoted di-
versity in programming. [d. The role of 
the government, the Court reasoned, 
is to promote the dissemination of 
diverse information. [d. at 3010. The 
Court determined that the process of 
disseminating diverse information, 
through programming, was essential to 
the public welfare, and thus an impor-
tant governmental objective. 
After finding FCC preference policies 
served an important governmental objec-
tive, the Court determined that the 
FCC's policies were substantially related 
to the achievement of the government's 
interest. [d. In reviewing the nexus 
between minority ownership and pro-
gramming diversity, the Court deferred 
to the fact-finding abilities of Congress 
and the FCC's expertise and noted that 
Congress made clear its view that mi-
nority ownership policies advanced the 
goal of diverse programming. The Court 
further noted Congress' continuallyex-
pressed support of diversity in program-
ming through minority ownership. [d. at 
3012-13. 
The Court found race-based classifi-
cation may be. permissible in some in-
stances. In supporting permissible 
benign discrimination, the Court anal-
ogized diversity in programming and the 
fair cross-section requirement of the 
sixth amendment, which forbids ex-
cluding groups from a jury venire on the 
basis of race or sex. In addition, the 
Court compared Metro Broadcasting 
with voting rights cases that permit 
benign discrimination to involve minor-
ities in the political process. [d. at 3019. 
Similarly, the Court reasoned, benign 
discrimination is permiSSible to promote 
programming diversity. [d. 
Next, the Court rejected Shurberg's 
final contention that the minority dis-
tress policy operated to exclude nonmi-
norities from consideration in the trans-
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fer of certain stations, and thus unduly 
burdens nonminorities. [d. at 3025. As 
the majority noted, the policy could only 
be invoked at the Commission's discre-
tion and distress sales only involved a 
small number of broadcast licenses. Fur-
thermore, the power to invoke the dis-
tress sale was in the hands of the non-
minority station owner who may choose 
to seek renewal by attending an FCC 
hearing, rather than sell his license to a 
minority group. This, the Court found, 
decreased the chance that nonminori-
ties would suffer an undue burden. [d. at 
3027. 
In a lengthy dissent, Justice O'Con-
nor, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice 
Scalia, and Justice Kennedy, contended 
that the constitution's guarantee of 
equal protection bound the federal and 
state governments equally, and that no 
lower level of scrutiny should be applied 
for federal action. [d. at 3030 (O'Con-
nor, )., dissenting). Justice O'Connor 
opined that the guarantee of equal pro-
tection extended to each citizen, re-
gardless of race. [d. at 3032 (O'Connor, 
)., dissenting). Neither the federal 
government nor the states may deny any 
person equal protection of the laws and 
governmental distinctions, she contended, 
among citizens based on race or ethni-
city would exact costs and carry sub-
stantial dangers. [d. (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). Justice O'Connor believed the 
FCC policies should have been evalu-
ated under strict scrutiny and that under 
such analysis, the FCC policies would 
fail. [d. at 3044. 
Metro Broadcasting is Significant as it 
illustrates the Supreme Court's imple-
mentation of an intermediate level of 
review for federal race-conscious affir-
mative action policies. While state pro-
grams continue to receive a strict scru-
tiny standard of review, federal affirmative 
action programs with the approval of 
Congress, need only survive the mid-. 
level test for constitutionality. Metro 
Broadcasting also signifies that Fulli-
love remains good law. 
- Daryl D.Jones 
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz: 
STATE'S USE OF SOBRIETY 
CHECKPOINTS DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
In Michigan Department of State Po-
lice v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990), the 
United States Supreme Court held that 
state highway sobriety checkpoints do 
not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution. The Court ruled that the state's 
interest in preventing drunk driving 
outweighed any intrusion upon drivers. 
The Michigan Department of State 
Police established a sobriety checkpoint 
program in 1986. Under specific gUide-
lines, sobriety checkpoints would be set 
up at selected sites along state roads. 
Vehicles passing through the check-
points would be stopped, and their driv-
ers would be briefly examined for signs 
of intoxication. Drivers displaying signs 
of alcohol impairment would be directed 
to a location out of the traffic flow 
where an officer would check the driv-
er's license and car registration and, if 
warranted, conduct further sobriety 
tests. An arrest would be made if the test 
results and observations by the police 
suggested that the driver was intoxi-
cated. [d. at 2484. At the only check-
point operated under the program, two 
of the drivers stopped were arrested for 
driving under the influence of alcohol. 
[d. 
Respondents, the day before the op-
eration of the first checkpOint, filed a 
complaint seeking relief from potential 
subjection to the checkpOints. The trial 
court applied the balancing test set forth 
in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), 
to decide the program's constitutional-
ity. This three prong test involved 
"balancing the state's interest in pre-
venting accidents caused by drunk driv-
ers, the effectiveness of sobriety check-
points in achieving that goal, and the 
level of intrusion on an individual's pri-
vacy caused by the checkpoints." Sitz, 
110 s. Ct. at 2484 (citing Brown, 433 
u.s. at 50-51). After applying the test, 
the trial court determined that the pro-
gram violated the fourth amendment. [d. 
Affirming the decision, the Michigan . 
Court of Appeals stated that the trial 
court was correct in its findings that the 
state had "a 'grave and legitimate' inter-
est in curbing drunken driving; [but] 
that sobriety checkpoint programs are 
